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Abstract 
The article attempts to define the relevant yardsticks that can be used to delineate the end of the 
transition process or, alternatively, a second stage in the post-socialist economic transformation into 
market capitalism. A first benchmark is EU accession, but it does not apply to non accession transitional 
economies. Moreover, a delay is going to appear between accession and the full benefit of common 
policies – a second transition period will open in May 2004. Convergence criteria are likely to postpone 
the end of transition for decades, if not for ever. Institution building varies significantly among transition 
countries, but the non accession countries are trapped for a long time in a no man’s land between the 
former system and a market economy with its necessary institutions. Our privileged analysis is that 
transition ends when the economic phenomena that are specific to transition will vanish (and the 
associated concepts will  disappear). These are assumed to be transformational recession, transitional 
unemployment, barterisation, the typical informal sector and managerial entrenchment. They are not 
going to fade away without a second stage of transition.  
JEL : F15, F43, O11, P27, P33 
Key words: transition economies, EU enlargement, economic convergence, institution building, 
transitional specificities 
1.  Introduction 
The process of transition started in the front running reforming economies of 
Central and Eastern Europe in 1989, and was followed in the CIS and Balkan countries 
since late 1991. Through this process, the so-called post-socialist economies in 
transition (PETs) were supposed to transform themselves into fully-fledged market 
economies and institutionally-built capitalisms. Fourteen years later, is the transition 
over? This question has been raised since the late 1990s in the comparative economics 
literature. Moreover, with EU accession of eight Central Eastern European countries 
(the CEEC8 in the following) in May 2004, and the expected admission of Bulgaria and 
Romania (the CEEC2) in 2007, the question is reactivated. Have these countries not 
been admitted earlier into the EU even though their economic convergence is real and 
their institutional harmonisation to the acquis communautaire is nearly complete? Has the 
most developed CEEC (Slovenia) not yet overtaken the level of economic development 
of the least developed incumbent EU member (Greece)?
2 However, the debate is open, 
since what pertains to Slovenia applies neither to other acceding CEECs nor to non-
accession countries in the Balkans and CIS (CIS12), on the one hand and, on the other 
hand, EU accession may not be a comprehensive criterion for assessing whether the 
transition process has reached its full stop or not.  
                                                 
1Honorary director of ROSES (CNRS), former EACES president (1997-98), incumbent president of the 
International Association of Sport Economists (2002-05). 
2 While Slovenia's GDP per capita has not yet overtaken Greece's in current dollars, when measured in 
PPP, the former ($18,233) exceeded the latter ($17,482) by 2001..  
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The debate about when transition will be over is a bit puzzling because 
extremely different yardsticks have been used to fix the end of the transition process. 
Some criteria are rather subjective such as ‘when I walk today in the street in Prague, I 
(as a westerner) do not feel in a different system’ or ‘when I am stuck in a traffic jam on 
my way to the Sheremetevo (Moscow) airport, I cannot imagine that I am not in a 
market economy’. Murrell (1996) has put it saying that transition will be over when 
developments in these countries erase the economic connotations of the adjective 
western European. Some others have referred to more institutional criteria, as Marie 
Lavigne (1999, p. 276) did: “as the European Union requires that its members be 
‘functioning market economies’, all the countries admitted into the EU would have by 
definition completed their transition”. Joining the EU would mean that economic and 
institutional transformation had been completed. But what about this criterion if, once 
admitted into the EU, the CEECs would not be treated – and would not benefit to the 
same extent from the same policy measures as – exactly as the incumbent members? 
This is the sort of perspective which raises some doubt against the comprehensive 
compliance of acceding CEECs to the requirements of a ‘well-functioning’ (not to speak 
of a fully-fledged) market economy. Since the benefit of some EU policies will be 
delayed for acceding CEECs, the issue is not an empty one and will be discussed first 
(section 1), arguing that a second transition period will start for the CEEC8 in May 
2004. Moreover, it may well be that, even after harmonising the whole acquis 
communautaire, some CEECs would remain, for years, rather remote from the average 
level of economic development within the EU. In other words, real convergence would 
not have progressed far enough to bring with it a genuine catching-up. It is then 
legitimate to conclude that “the problems and policy issues confronted by today’s 
transition economies resemble those faced by other countries at similar levels of 
development” (Gelb, 1999, p. 36). In some sense, the study of PETs would increasingly 
leave the area of comparative economics for development economics but, by the same 
token, it would mean that a second stage of economic development is required for 
PETs (including CEECs) to catch up (section 2). The World Bank (2002) considers that 
transition is not over as long as there is still a wide dispersion in the productivity of 
labour and capital across types of enterprises due to a mix of new enterprises and old 
restructured (or even not yet restructured) firms. Thus, the phasing out of enterprise 
restructuring is to be added to the level of economic development in the catching up of 
PETs.  
Another subtle approach (Brada & Kutan, 2000, p. 113) suggests that “rapid 
system change will cease, and economic institutions will stabilise” so that “even if 
legacies from the communist era persist, the policy concerns in both successful and 
unsuccessful transition economies will lose their uniqueness”. However, in unsuccessful 
PETs, a new economic system will combine ‘etatism’, paternalism, cronyism, 
kleptocratic and rent-seeking behaviour with weak market institutions. It is obvious here 
that the transition process can not be regarded as being over, unless one agrees that, 
from the very beginning, the objective of a new ‘crony rent-seeking state’ capitalist 
system is as acceptable as a well-functioning market economy. A second transition is 
then urgently needed, based on those measures likely to reduce ‘etatism’, cronyism, and 
rent-seeking and to strengthen market institutions, i.e.  a second stage focused on 
institution building (section 3). Those PETs which cause most concern (primarily the 
CIS12) are at a crossroads. Should they improve little by little the existing formal and 
informal institutions – and phase out the dysfunctional ones – that result today from the  
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initial stage of the transition process? Or should they erase all at once the inefficient 
institutions and rebuild the entire institutional setting from scratch?  
For instance, in the face of the dubious outcome of privatisation in Russia and 
the CIS (Nellis, 2002; Andreff 2003a), an improvement could consist in upgrading as far 
as possible the existing corporate governance structure of privatised firms, in giving up 
the wrong privatisation schemes – such as mass privatisation – for privatisation through 
asset sales, and in promoting the entry of new start-ups instead of striving to privatise 
unmarketable state assets. Such is the new World Bank’s train of thought (World Bank, 
2002) which expresses, in addition, the need for PETs to consolidate the gains of the 
first decade of transition and address ‘second generation’ reform issues (p. 6), i.e. the 
need for a second stage of the transition process, going beyond the former Washington 
consensus (stabilisation-liberalisation-privatisation). A more radical option, as regards to 
the privatisation outcome, is to recommend that assets of privatised firms that do not 
pay taxes within a sixty-day deadline should be seized (Stiglitz, 2002). Stiglitz considers 
re-nationalisation as a solution to tax arrears and as a path towards a new re-
privatisation which would be more legitimate than, for instance the ‘loans for shares’ 
scheme promoted under Yeltsin. Even Jeffrey Sachs – formerly an advocate of mass 
and rapid privatisation – is known to have stated that the Russian government should 
re-nationalise the valuable firms wrongly privatised through the loans for shares, with a 
view to re-privatising them fairly (Nellis, 2002). We would not elaborate here on the 
reasons why this radical solution would probably destabilise again the relevant PETs, 
leading to a second (re-nationalisation) and third (re-privatisation) wave of asset 
stripping, capital flight, embezzlements, bribery, corruption, money laundering, and 
violent appropriation of assets and so on and so forth 
3. Thus, it is clear that Stiglitz, 
Sachs and others are clearly wondering about another different stage in the transition 
process.  
The only problem with the aforementioned approaches is that, after looking at 
the results of the initial stage, the second stage of transition is clearly required 
empirically in view of scheduling new economic policy measures, but its theoretical 
background is missing. An attempt at a theoretical sequencing of two different stages in 
the ongoing transition process (Andreff, 2003b) dwells upon the fact that a number of 
transition ‘surprises’ have of course not been expected (or not to the extent observed in 
the statistics) by mainstream economic analysis of transition, and the analysis of such 
surprises in the early years of transition has been neglected. Surprises such as 
transformational recession, transitional unemployment, barterisation, a flourishing 
informal economy, and managerial entrenchment encompass economic facts specific to 
the transition process from the former planned economy to a market economy. The 
associated concepts have not yet received a definitely accepted and uncontroversial 
economic analysis (Andreff, 2001a). We contend that transition will be over when all 
these specific surprises disappear, and the associated concepts lose their relevance 
(section 4).  
                                                 
3 This is extensively argued in Andreff (2004).  
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2.  A second stage towards the full benefit of EU membership: the CEEC 
case 
As a symbol, EU enlargement is very significant for both incumbent and 
acceding EU members. In this respect, it is not surprising at all that EU membership is 
associated with the end of a process – i.e., the end of accession negotiations. If the 
accession countries were only less developed, poorer and more agricultural (like Greece, 
Portugal and Spain in the 1980s) than incumbent members, they should benefit, without 
any specific advantage and without any specific restriction, from all common EU 
policies, immediately after accession. This would mean that by the date of accession 
they will have fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria (1993), that is:  
1.  stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law and 
human rights;  
2.  the existence of a functioning economy capable to cope with pressures 
and market forces within the UE;  
3.  the ability to take on obligations of membership, including adherence to 
the aims of political, economic and monetary union, and harmonisation 
of the entire acquis communautaire.  
But this cannot be said about the CEEC10. Changeovers of political power 
between different parties have taken place during the last fourteen years in nearly all 
them, so that the first Copenhagen criterion must be regarded as being nearly fulfilled. 
On the other hand, negotiations between some accession countries and the European 
Commission until end of December 2002, regarding hot issues such as EU budget, the 
common agricultural policy (CAP) and structural funds, have been extremely harsh. This 
shows that CEECs have not yet comprehensively filled criteria 2 and 3 above. The EU 
position eventually softened towards Poland and Latvia, which were further than the 
other CEEC8 from closing all 31 chapters of the accession negotiation by the 
December 2002 deadline. In fact, the European council in Copenhagen (2002) admitted 
different speeds of economic and institutional convergence of accession countries. On 
these grounds, the accession of Bulgaria and Romania has been postponed up to 2007 
while the Baltic states and Slovenia have been assessed as “being able to take over the 
acquis communautaire in the medium term only if they achieve significant efforts”. Only 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and (not without some political pressures) 
Poland were judged capable of taking over most of the acquis in the medium term, if 
they progress in some specific sectors (namely CAP, the land market, workers’ 
migration, regional development or environmental externalities, depending on the 
country). When deciding that all the CEEC8 are ready to sign the accession treaty, the 
Copenhagen council has somehow adopted a big bang policy of enlargement. As a 
consequence, in all CEEC8, the European Commission considers that a lot remains to 
be done until May 2004, not only in harmonising the acquis but even more so in 
enforcing it. No one bet that by May 2004 its comprehensive enforcement will have 
fully materialised in all the CEEC8.  
What can we learn from the previous evidence? The fifth EU enlargement is 
politically too important, and historically too symbolic, to be submitted to a strict 
economic and institutional conditionality. But economic analysis cannot be satisfied 
with a sequencing of the end of transition, relying on a mere political will and on 
historical symbols. However, some other signals have recently emerged that seem to 
profess, for instance, that Russia has reached the stage of a fully-fledged market  
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economy: the U.S. government, and later on the European Commission, have officially 
recognized Russia
4 as a genuinely functioning market economy; the FATF
5 has 
withdrawn Russia from its black list of financially rogue states even though a whole 
UNODCCP (2001) report has exhibited Russia as one of the major home countries for 
international money laundering. On top of these politically-determined decisions, there 
is obviously a transition fatigue of western governments when facing a long-lasting 
process which has not simply ended up with the phasing out of the economic policy 
backed by the Washington consensus.   
 
One of the strongest arguments in favour of the claim that, after EU accession, 
the CEEC economic transition will go on, simply consists in witnessing the planned 
delay between the date of their accession and the date when they are to obtain the full 
benefit of all policies and advantages which apply to incumbent members. This delay is 
the clearest proof of a second transition period after accession. The structural aids to 
accession countries which are budgeted by the EU for 2004-2006 represent a transitory 
measure. The real benefit in terms of structural funds and cohesion funds that will 
accrue to acceding CEECs will be determined only with the adoption of the 
forthcoming EU budget for 2007-2013. The negotiations about this budget promise to 
be extremely harsh – probably even harsher than the accession negotiations themselves. 
They will have to reconcile the extension of the regional development policy (structural 
and cohesion funds) to the new CEECs members with the determination of the 
incumbent members, announced in the Berlin European council (1999), to stabilise the 
EU budget, and with the reluctance of regions (countries) that currently benefit from 
structural and cohesion funds to give them up in favour of less developed regions in the 
CEECs. With the fifth enlargement, 67 regions, all the regions of the CEECs except 
Bratislava, Ljubljana and Prague, will be entitled to structural funds, while at least 15 
regions (23 after Bulgaria’s and Romania’s accession) in Greece, Italy, Spain, France and 
East Germany will lose the benefit of these funds. The idea of re-nationalising regional 
development policies is thus pushed forward by the experts of the main net contributors 
to the EU budget – Germany, the Netherlands and the U.K.  
When it comes to CAP, the Berlin council did not envisage the full extension of 
direct financial aid to the accession countries’ agriculture. It was admitted however, in 
2002, that accession countries could not be excluded indefinitely from the agricultural 
acquis and should benefit from it some time in the future (Duboz, 2002). Otherwise, the 
single European market would be meaningless in the agricultural sector. Finally, the 
European Commission made the decision that CEEC peasants will not receive 100% of 
the financial subsidies they are entitled to from 2004, the excuse being that these 
subsidies would slowdown and freeze the modernisation and restructuring of existing 
farms in CEECs. A ten year transition period was introduced before the full benefit of 
CAP by CEEC agriculture: CEEC peasants will get only 25% of the entitled payments 
in 2004, 30% in 2005, 35% in 2006, and eventually 100% in 2013. Thus, a second 
transition stage is already planned in agriculture.  
In some other common policy areas, the CEECs will also be affected by a 
second transition period. Negotiations about the free movement of labour resulted in a 
                                                 
4 It was of course before Mikhaïl Khodorkovski’s imprisonment.  
5 Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering  – a group for financial action against money 
laundering under the aegis of the OECD.  
EJCE, vol. 1, n. 1 (2004) 
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seven year transitory period, divided into three stages. During the first two years after 
accession incumbent members are allowed to maintain all existing restrictions against 
inward worker migration from CEECs. The EU15 will keep the option of prolonging 
national controls over labour migration for another three years. But even after five years 
it would still be possible to restrict labour inflows from the CEECs if they are seriously 
destabilising the EU labour market for two more years. Thus Germany and Austria, 
where the prospect is an inflow of CEEC manpower in the range of 2.5 million and 
470,000 migrant workers respectively—only 100,000 in France—it is expected that the 
transition period for labour migration will last up to 2011. On the other hand, the 
CEECs will be entitled to limited transitory periods for adjusting to European norms 
and establishing an efficient regulation of their banking sector. Some CEECs, namely 
Poland, have negotiated a seven year transition period before EU investors (from 
foreign countries) will be allowed to buy agricultural land. All in all, the CEEC8 will 
enter in May 2004 a second transition period which is likely to last until 2011-2013 (even 
later in the case of Bulgaria and Romania) depending on the EU policy concerned. 
This additional transition period notwithstanding, the stress is now on creating a 
big common market, first of 25 countries (including Cyprus and Malta) and then of 27 
countries (with Bulgaria and Romania).  The fifth enlargement should provide this 
market with a strong growth potential due to the 19% increase in its geographical size 
and the 15% increase in its population. The emergence of a stronger European 
economic might based on a 375 (by then over 400) million consumers is a real fact as 
well as a mighty symbol. The EU-CEEC international trade has already materialised in 
very substantial gains before the fifth enlargement as a result of the association 
agreements (Andreff, 2001b). For the CEECs, the share of the EU in their overall 
foreign trade has grown from roughly 40% in 1990 to 70% now, and simulations with 
gravity models have shown that it may rise to up to 80%. Nevertheless, transition is not 
over – and will not be over by 2004 – as regards the CEEC trade reorientation towards 
EU countries. Even if slower, the commercial integration of CEECs within EU will be a 
continuing process in the coming years.  
The Stability Pact launched in 1999 with the five Balkan countries is to be 
followed by the negotiation of stabilisation and association agreements (already signed 
with Croatia and Macedonia) which promise a free trade area with the EU within six 
years and refer to the potential candidacy for EU membership. The application of 
Croatia, and its hope to join Bulgaria and Romania in the 2007 wave, should not 
obscure the fact that for most Balkan countries EU membership is a long term prospect 
that will not materialise before the second decade of the 21rst century, since the real 
starting point of transition has been delayed after 1991 due to the Balkan wars. The 
transition process will still last some time in this area. The partnership agreements 
signed with the EU by the CIS12, except Tajikistan, do not even refer to potential 
candidacy so that, if EU membership is taken as the benchmark for the end of 
transition, CIS countries are stuck in transition for ever, or at least beyond any 
foreseeable future. This demonstrates the fallacy of the discussed criterion. Joining EU 
only proves that the CEECs have progressed on their transition path and have come 
closer politically and economically to incumbent members than any other PET, but it 
does not say whether a second stage of transition will be needed – and for how long it 
may last.  
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3.  Real and nominal economic convergence: a second stage of catching 
up 
When it comes to economic convergence between the CEECs and EU 
incumbent members, the criterion for assessing the end of transition switches to 
macroeconomic variables and eventually the level of economic development in PETs 
comes to the fore. We return to the above-mentioned Copenhagen criteria and to the 
convergence of real macroeconomic variables, and to the Maastricht criteria – now the 
stability pact
6 criteria – of nominal convergence (Andreff, 1999a). Even though the 
latter are not EU accession criteria, but only preconditions for joining the euro, they 
have constantly been referred to during the accession negotiations. Moreover, once they 
are EU members the CEECs have to apply those macroeconomic policy measures that 
enable them to stick to the EMS II, and the result will be some sort of nominal 
convergence. All the more so if a country intends, after two years in the EMS II, to join 
the euro. 
 
Table 1: Nominal convergence between accession countries and the European Union 
Country  Inflation rate  Long term interest 
rate 
Fiscal deficit/GDP  Public 
debt/GDP 
  1993 2000 2001 1993  2000  2001  1993  2000  2001  1993  2000 2001
Bulgaria  56.0 10.3  7.4  63.0  11.5 11.1 15.7 1.1  1.5  111.0  94.1  n.a. 
Czech  Rep. 20.8 3.9 4.7 16.5  7.2  7.1  (-1.4)b 3.0  1.9  29.0 15.1  16.9
Estonia  89.8 4.0 5.7 17.2  7.4  7.8  1.1  (-0.2)b (-2.6) 
b 
n.a. 3.1 2.7 
Hungary  22.5 9.8 9.2 28.5  12.6  12.1  6.3  3.5  3.0  65.0 55.0  57.6
Latvia  109.0 2.7 2.5 27.0  11.9  11.2  (-0.6) 
b 
2.7 1.4 n.a.  13.2  15.0
Lithuania  411.0 1.0 1.2 108.0 12.1  9.6  4.9  1.3  0.4  n.a.  23.3  23.0
Poland  35.3 10.1  5.5  48.5  20.0 18.4 4.0  (-0.3) 
b 
4.4 54.0  39.6  40.4
Romania  256.0 45.7 34.5 70.0  47.3  36.1  0.1  4.0  3.1  16.0  34.7 31.6
Slovakia  23.2 12.0  7.3  16.5  14.9 11.2 7.1  3.0  3.2  29.0  30.3  42.2
Slovenia  32.3 10.9  9.4  49.6  15.8 15.1 0.3  1.3  1.1  n.a. 25.7  27.4
Mean  105.6 11.0  8.7  44.5  16.1 14.0 3.8  2.0  1.8  50.7  33.4  28.5
Standard 
dev. 
122.4 12.8 9.4  28.2  11.6  8.5  4.9  1.4  1.8  31.6  25.9 16.6
Maastrichta 3.2  3.1 3.4 9.1  9.4  8.8  3.0  3.0  3.0  60.0 60.0  60.0
a Value of the Maastricht criterion  b Minus means here a fiscal surplus  
Sources: EBRD and World Bank. 
Comparing the fulfilment of nominal convergence criteria by the CEECs in 
2000-2001 to1993 (Table 1), it is crystal clear that they have moved forward toward the 
inflation rates prevailing in the EU. In 1993, no CEEC was close to the Maastricht 
target (3.2%); in 2000-2001, both Latvia and Lithuania have satisfied the stability pact 
inflation criterion and the Czech Republic and Estonia were not far from fulfilling it. 
                                                 
6 Although the stability pact seems to be jeopardized by a fiscal deficit over 3% of GDP in 2003, and 
probably in 2004, in France and Germany, both countries have accepted to come back in the tracks in 
2005 after budget stabilisation measures. For example, in France, all the civil servants wages are frozen 
in 2003, and a wage cap (a 0.5% limited increase) is planned in the public and governmental sector for 
2004.  
EJCE, vol. 1, n. 1 (2004) 
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The same conclusion applies for long term interest rates, the Czech Republic and 
Estonia being below the target while Latvia, Lithuania and Hungary were not very far. 
In 2000, only Romania had too high a fiscal deficit and in 2001 – only Poland. Except 
for Bulgaria, all the accession countries comply with the public debt criterion. Half the 
CEEC10 currencies are stabilised within fluctuation bands that are narrower than or 
equal to those defining the EMS II (Table 2). In several CEECs, the exchange rate 
regime has evolved toward more flexibility in recent years, even though in countries 
with a floating exchange rate central bank interventions are aimed at stabilising the 
domestic currency against a targeted hard currency.  
Thus, the CEECs have markedly converged in nominal terms towards EU 
countries and the Maastricht criteria. Does it mean that most of them will be ready to 
join the EMS II soon after the fifth EU enlargement? Does it mean that transition is 
over? For sure, one aspect of it, the stabilisation of nominal variables has nearly been 
achieved. However, on average, CEEC inflation rates and long term interest rates still 
remain too high. Moreover, it is not obvious that it would be worth the CEECs to hurry 
up to join the EMS II and then the euro. In those CEECs with a free or managed 
floating exchange rate, sticking to a fluctuation band or to the euro may be destabilising 
while in CEECs with a fixed exchange rate the strict fulfilment of nominal convergence 
criteria implies a lasting austerity policy before entering the euro, which may be followed 
by a devastating relaxation of this policy once inside the euro (Aglietta et al., 2003). 
Joining the euro too swiftly is likely to deepen the CEECs trade deficit (Doisy & Hervé, 
2003) which, beyond some threshold, will jeopardize the requirements of sticking to 
exchange rate stability. Thus, if belonging to the euro is the deadline for the end of 
transition, it will require a number of years for CEECs to reach it (not to speak of the 
current EU members that are opting out: are they not fully-fledged market economies?). 
It seems sensible to give up nominal convergence as a yardstick by which to measure 
how close the CEECs are to the end of transition.  
 
Table 2: Table 2 – The exchange rate regimes in Central and Eastern Europe 




Bulgarian lev  01.01.1999 Currency board  Euro  0% 
Czech crown  27.05.1997 Managed floating rate  Euro   
Estonian crown  01.01.1999 Currency board  Euro  3% 
Hungarian forint  01.10.2001 Crawling band  Euro  15% 
Latvian lats  02. 1994  Fixed anchor  SDR  1% 
Lithuanian litas  01.02.2002 Currency board  Euro  0% 
Polish zloty  01.04.2000 Managed floating rate  Euro   
Romanian leu  08.1992  Managed floating rate     
Slovak crown  02.10.1998 Floating rate  Euro   
Slovene tolar  01.1992  Managed floating rate  Euro   
Source: EBRD 
If we accept nevertheless that the CEEC10's nominal convergence would soon 
be completed, then we are left with the problem of Balkan and CIS countries. In 2001, 
for instance, their average inflation rate was in the range of 16-17%, a level reached by 
the CEEC8 as early as 1995. Again, we have to conclude that a second transition stage 
would be necessary now in two-thirds of the PETs, to reduce inflation to the EU rates.  
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Besides, nominal convergence is not enough if it is not complemented by real 
convergence. 
Converging nominal variables are not independent of the real macroeconomic 
variables. Nominal convergence pertains to prices, including interest rates and the rate 
of exchange, but the latter variables do depend to some extent on the momentum of 
real variables – and vice versa. For example, the CEECs lasting trade deficit, regardless of 
the exchange rate regime, reflects a structural weakness of domestic savings as 
compared to the level of investment required by the real convergence (the gap has been 
filled by foreign direct investment so far). The relative weakness of CEECs currencies 
also results from a missing real convergence, similar to the one that was observed in the 
southern EU countries several years ago.  
 
Table 3: Real convergence between the CEECs and EU countries: growth and unemployment 
  1992  1994  1996 1998 2000 
CEEC10 GDP rate of growth   
   mean  (-11.5) 2.7  2.6  2.7  4.2 
   standard deviation  12.2  2.2  4.7  3.4  1.6 
EU15 GDP rate of growth   
   mean  1.1  3.0  2.6  3.7  4.3 
   standard deviation  1.9  1.5  1.6  1.6  2.0 
CEEC10  unemployment  rate         
   mean  8.1  9.9  9.2  10.1  11.9 
   standard deviation  5.4  4.5  3.7  3.1  3.8 
EU15 unemployment rate   
   mean  8.5  10.4  9.9  8.5  6.9 
   standard deviation  4.3  5.1  4.5  4.0  3.4 
Calculated in Andreff (2003b) 
 
Table 3 shows that, after the 1993 growth recovery in the CEECs, their average 
growth rate has converged towards the EU average, except during the 1998 Russian 
financial crisis. The convergence of unemployment until 1997 is even more striking; 
afterwards, unemployment in the CEECs starts to diverge upwards from the EU 
unemployment path. The standard deviation gives an idea of the σ-convergence. In the 
growth recovery period, the dispersion between the CEECs growth rates has decreased 
and, compared to the mean value, the dispersion of unemployment rates is very narrow. 
Therefore, effective signs of σ-convergence within the CEEC10 and between them and 
EU average are noticeable (it is even confirmed with a larger number of real variables in 
Andreff, 1999 & 2003b). Is it good news as regards to the end of transition? Not really. 
Let us put it this way: if the growth rate is nearly the same, with a narrow dispersion 
around averages, in a sample of developed countries (EU) and a sample of less 
developed countries (CEECs), this means that there is no significant catching up of the 
former by the latter. Then, if the end of post-socialist transition is gauged by the gap in 
the level of economic development, this end is not to be expected before several 
decades.  
A sound evaluation of real convergence also requires a test of β-convergence. In 
a previous work (Andreff, 2003b), the calculation of β-convergence within the CEEC10 
sample has exhibited a swifter speed of real convergence (nearly 3%) than in EU  
EJCE, vol. 1, n. 1 (2004) 
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countries (2%). A recent more sophisticated econometric analysis (Tykhonenko, 2003) 
invalidates the above-mentioned implicit assumption of an absolute β-convergence 
between CEECs and EU countries and verifies a conditional convergence in which the 
variables determining the trend of convergence are domestic credit to the private sector, 
the ratio of foreign trade to GDP, the ratio of export to GDP, civil rights and political 
liberty, and the absence of war. Moreover, the same work identifies convergence clubs 
with an extremely interesting outcome: the CEEC8 are in the same club with Greece, 
Portugal, Spain, Belarus, Croatia and Russia, while another convergence club gathers the 
twelve remaining (more developed) EU countries, and a third club encompasses the 
fourteen remaining Balkan and CIS countries (including Bulgaria and Romania). The 
problem is that the growth paths are diverging from one convergence club to the other, 
basically due to initial conditions at the beginning of transition. Thus, it seems that the 
length of the transition period heavily depends on where a PET comes from, and its end 
cannot be expected within a decade for most Balkan and CIS countries. 
 
Table 4: The development gap between the CEECs and EU countries: GDP per capita, $PPP 
Country 1990  1992 1995 1997 1999 2001 Country
b  2000 
Greece   11,967 12,368  13,415  14,382 15,427 17,482 Armenia  614 
Portugal  11,176  12420  13,812 15,103 16,341 17,571 Azerbaijan  653 
Spain  12,848  14,047 15,463 16,623 18340  20,374 Belarus  1,274 
Bulgaria  5,207  4,703 5,822 4,862 5,196 6,179 Croatia  4,206 
Czech  Rep.  12,357  10,801 12530  13,266 13,258 14,884 Georgia  562 
Estonia  7,934  6,321 6,541 8,087 8,631 10380  Kazakhstan 1,231 
Hungary  9,517 8,578  9,638  10,221 11,394 12,941 Kyrgyz  Rep. 289 
Latvia  7,794  6,575 5,047 5,793 6,417 7,759 Macedonia  1,792 
Lithuania  9,059  6,575 5620  6,571 6,849 7,764 Moldova  398 
Poland  5,675  5,508 6,824 7,701 8,514 9,326 Russia  1,784 
Romania 6,219  5,395 6,569 6,512 6,298 7,036 Serbia-Mont.  942 
Slovakia  9,029  7,644 8,703 9,902 10,732  11,739  Tajikistan  160 
Slovenia 11,345  11,145  13,254  14,586 16,216 18,233 Turkmenistan  473 
a in 1991, b current dollars      Ukraine  634 
Source: EBRD       Uzbekistan  264 
 
Even the most developed CEECs have to go through a second stage of real 
convergence if the target is to reach 90% of the EU average GDP per capita, the 
threshold beyond which a member country is no longer considered a poor country and 
is no longer entitled to social cohesion funds. Except Slovenia, no CEEC seems likely to 
be able to attain this threshold within a decade, and it might be no sooner than 2040 in 
the case of Bulgaria and Romania. Thus in terms of catching-up, the end of transition is 
even further than when other yardsticks are used. Regarding some CIS countries, 
catching up would probably need a century or so. Not surprisingly, it takes decades for 
developing countries to close the gap with developed countries, as the experience of 
emerging Asian and Latin American countries exemplifies it. But it may be that a 
criterion deeply rooted in development economics is not the most suitable gauge for 
fixing the end of a systemic transition. There were more and less developed economies 
within the former socialist bloc until 1989, and there are still developed, underdeveloped 
and impoverished countries in the capitalist system.    
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Eventually the convergence of CEECs unemployment rates towards the EU 
average gives some ground to the assumption according to which converging from a 
centrally planned to a market system does not only trigger favourable or desirable 
economic trends; some of which can be assumed into a negative convergence or 
congruence hypothesis (Andreff, 1992). The CEECs, having established a more liberal 
labour market than in the EU countries, and facing the heavy task of restructuring the 
whole economy, their unemployment rate has skyrocketed above the EU average in 
recent years. It is over 7% in all the CEEC10 and below 10% only in Hungary and the 
Baltic states. As a consequence, with the fifth enlargement the EU25 will gain overnight 
more than 5 million additional unemployed. It is a major cause of the very cautious 
migration policy of the incumbent members and of their imposition of a seven year 
transition period. In addition, roughly another 5 million unemployed are likely to move 
through the new EU borders from Balkan and CIS countries. New visa regimes aim at 
closing the door to migrant workers from the South and the East of the enlarged 
Europe and, by the same token, postpone the end of transition as far as employment is 
concerned (a new ‘wall’ separating the EU labour market from its southern and eastern 
neighbouring markets). 
4.  A second stage of institution building: the case of the CIS and the 
Balkans  
The main benefit for accession countries is qualitative, in that EU accession is 
transferring to them a new set of institutions. The great bulk of it is contained in the 
acquis communautaire which must not only be legally implemented but also enforced in the 
CEEC8 and then the CEEC2. Once the acquis is comprehensively enacted and enforced 
in an accession country, the latter will have more than 75% of enterprise assets in 
private ownership, no state ownership of small enterprises and a free land market. 
Furthermore, effective corporate control exercised through domestic financial 
institutions and markets, comprehensive price liberalisation and efficiency-enhancing 
regulation of utility pricing,  effective enforcement of competition policy securing 
unrestricted entry into most markets. In international relations, the removal of most 
tariff barriers and WTO membership, and in the financial market, a full convergence of 
banking laws and regulations with BIS standards and the provision of a full set of 
competitive banking services, a full convergence of securities laws and regulations with 
IOSCO standards and a fully developed non-bank intermediation. In terms of the 
EBRD transition indicators, the mark of “4+” for all indicators is required – no CEEC 
has so far more than two 4+ marks. Thus, if we refer to the yardstick of institution 
building, transition is clearly not complete today and will not be completed by May 2004 
in the CEECs. Again, a second stage of transition is required.  
In concluding the 31 chapters of accession negotiations, the European 
Commission has simply notified the incumbent EU members that their citizens and 
enterprises will meet in the CEECs an institutional environment of a market economy 
which is going to become increasingly comparable to the one they are accustomed to 
meet in their home countries. Human rights, civil rights, free mobility, free circulation of 
information and public security are legally more or less guaranteed today in the CEECs, 
in addition to the acquis communautaire. The devil is in the details of effective enforcement 
which can and must improve after accession. Bankruptcy laws must be more 
systematically enforced, the enforcement of corporate laws has to be improved. The  
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protection of minority shareholders is still quite far from effective, and corporate 
governance is still weak in a number of privatised enterprises (see below: managerial 
entrenchment).  
The issues of the enforcement of competition policy and state financial subsidies 
have spoiled the accession negotiations with most CEECs, e.g., in the steel industry with 
Poland, the car industry with Hungary and the Czech Republic, and in various industries 
with Slovakia. Whatever the CEECs' efforts until May 2004 may be, the enforcement of 
competition policy will remain weak as long as widespread state subsidies are prevalent 
and collusion still exists between the state and firms, even privatised ones, and while 
some privatisation outcomes have not yet been finalised. The European Commission 
routinely points at corruption, economic crime,  courts that lack independence and the 
required means to settle commercial cases and protect property rights (even though the 
situation is considerably better in this respect in the CEECs compared with Balkan and 
CIS countries). The fight against corruption, money laundering and economic crime in 
accession countries will be on the agenda for years after May 2004.
7 Perhaps it will be 
kept on the agenda even beyond the end of transition, however the latter is defined. A 
second stage of transition in CEECs thus will be one of enforcing more systematically 
the whole institutional setup after having first legally implemented the acquis 
communautaire. 
In other PETs, in particular in the CIS12, the systemic reforms have been 
flawed by an insufficient and ineffective institutional change. In Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and 
Moldova the pace of reforms has slowed down after the mid-1990s. Belarus has 
preserved most features of a centrally planned economy while progress on the transition 
path has been very slow in Uzbekistan and quite negligible in Turkmenistan. Tajikistan 
has started reforming in earnest only in 1997. In such countries, it is not the question of 
a second stage in the transformation process which is open; the real concern is still the 
first stage of transition. Privatisation programmes, even in Russia, have primarily 
proceeded with mass privatisation and management-employee buy-outs (MEBOs) 
which have often transferred assets to incumbent managers (Andreff, 2004). Enterprises 
in the CIS are now mostly owned by a combination of dominant management insiders 
and dispersed employee-owners and outsiders. In many CIS countries, residual state 
property is significant (Andreff, 2000). This corporate governance structure, resulting 
from mass privatisation and MEBOs did not by itself bring about firm restructuring 
(Andreff, 2003a). One decade after launching the privatisation drive, CIS countries 
realise that supporting institutional reforms are necessary in order to yield positive 
effects from privatisation. Ownership matters, but even more so do institutions.  
After one decade of transition, most CIS countries are still without genuinely 
comprehensive price and trade liberalisation. Among the CIS12, only Armenia, Georgia, 
Kyrgyzstan and Moldova have so far joined the WTO. In spite of the new fiscal codes 
introduced in most CIS countries, the efficiency of tax collection remains rather low by 
international standards. As a result, governments are unable to collect enough taxes to 
finance a market-supporting legal system or to guarantee effective judicial enforcement 
of legal rules. Thus, there are a greater number of obstacles to the institution of the rule 
of law in the CIS12 than in the CEEC10. The winners in the early phases of transition 
                                                 
7 Jean-Claude Trichet (2002) was recently calling the acceding governments to seriously fight against 
money laundering using money transfers abroad, and against intertwined economic crime and terrorism 
(Mr. Trichet has since been appointed to head of the European Central Bank).   
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successfully attempt to block further institutional reforms that could threaten their 
newly acquired vested interests. Commercial law is not sufficiently enforced due to a 
lack of adequate administrative and judicial support when it is not due to outright 
corruption. Competition policy is not yet able to guard against the abuse and misuse of 
market power. Enforcement of bankruptcy laws remains problematic and does not lead 
to firm exit, while barriers to entry still consist of bureaucratic hurdles, unpredictable 
regulations, incumbent managerial positions and political connections. These provide 
strong incentives for small and medium enterprises to operate in the informal economy.  
Many CIS countries are trapped in situations of partial reform, whose progress is 
blocked by the winners of the initial stages. Therefore a second stage of institutional 
transition is badly needed in CIS countries, and to a lesser extent in the Balkans.  
5.  A theoretically delineated second stage of the transition process: the 
disappearance of transition surprises 
The perspective of EU accession since 1993 has exacerbated a deep divergence 
between the CEEC8 on the one hand, the CIS12 on the other hand with the Balkan 
countries in between. Given their different initial conditions, the unexpected and 
undesirable developments – the so-called transition surprises – have been much fewer 
and less extreme in the CEECs than in CIS countries. These differences have served to 
support the argument that transition will end up with the fifth EU enlargement, but of 
course only in the CEECs. However, EU accession by itself does not guarantee that 
transition surprises will disappear overnight. Moreover, in Balkan and CIS countries 
transition surprises, which are caused by the specific processes of the systemic 
transformation, are likely to last longer. Now, I would support the view that the end of 
the transition process must be associated with the comprehensive disappearance of 
transition surprises in post-communist economic transformation (Andreff, 2001a & 
2003b). Let me put it this way: transformation will reach its end when the economic 
processes that are specific to post-communist transition have entirely disappeared.  
The question now is: what are these specific economic processes? The answer, 
in a nutshell, consists in looking for economic facts and analyses that cannot be resorted 
to when observing developed and developing market economies in which no 
communist regime and no command (and centrally planned) economy have ever 
prevailed before. Such a statement is of course open to a wide debate. However, the 
emergence of an economic process which is not expected by the current mainstream 
economic analysis of transition to a market economy has a very high probability to be 
specific. It is a 'surprise' after the collapse of the communist regime and the command 
economy, and after the break-up of CMEA and the USSR (Ellman 1997; Ledeneva & 
Seabright 2000). A less demanding version of the criterion is that an economic 
consequence of the transition policy is not expected to reach the wide scope and 
significance actually observed in the statistics. For instance, recession and 
unemployment were not entirely unexpected, but output collapse and mass 
unemployment were not forecasted to be as pronounced. If accepted as relevant, the 
suggested analysis will fix the end of transition at the moment when transformational 
recession, transitional unemployment, barterisation, a flourishing informal economy and 
managerial entrenchment have ended. No one of the PETs is on the brink of 
simultaneously getting rid of all these five transitional economic phenomena.   
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The five stylised economic phenomena specific to the transition period, and 
their associated concepts, have not yet been offered a definitely accepted and 
uncontroversial economic analysis. In fact, various economic explanations of 
transformational recession compete, depending on the economic paradigm (mainstream, 
post-Keynesian, evolutionist, etc.) one has in mind. The same applies to transitional 
unemployment, barterisation, the informal economy and managerial entrenchment. 
Economists still proceed by trial and error, and econometricians do test alternative 
hypotheses without being able to determine the most sensible and relevant independent 
variables explaining the five phenomena observed in all PETs. Some room is left for 
intuitive economic analysis of the five above-listed processes, and it is exactly why 
transition economics remains interesting fourteen years after the start of transformation.  
The concept of transformational recession has been coined by Kornai (1994). The 
corresponding stylised fact has been referred to as an output fall or production collapse. 
After four years of transition, average CEEC GDP declined to 79% of its 1989 level. 
Output fall has been even more marked in the Baltic states and lasted five years, and in 
CIS countries nine years. Output fall has caught mainstream economic analysis of 
transition on the wrong foot. As stated by Blanchard (1997), the former economic 
system was characterised by a myriad of imbalances so that one should have to expect 
that phasing them out would increase, not decrease, production. In other words, output 
should have skyrocketed instead of collapsing (Stiglitz, 1999). Today, in all PETs, 
transformational recession is over even though we do not have a single unified analysis 
of it at hands. 
The first assumption blames the output fall to the collapse of aggregated demand 
(Laski & Badhuri, 1997). Shock therapy is assessed as 'guilty'. In such a post-Keynesian 
analysis, a policy that reduces money supply will not only lower the newly-liberalised 
prices, but will also affect quantities downwards. The second hypothesis puts the cause 
of output fall on the supply side. Facing a dramatic shift in the structure of aggregated 
demand, the market has not met its match due to supply side rigidities, resource 
immobility and the like (Gomulka, 2000), inherited from the past. Moreover, the 
restrictive monetary policy embedded in shock therapy has also affected the supply side: 
the credit crunch has dried up financial resources that enterprises need for input 
purchases and, thus, has hindered production. Interest rates have skyrocketed 
preventing enterprises from borrowing – and state banks from lending – in order to 
finance input purchases (Calvo & Coricelli, 1993).  
A third approach analyses transformational recession as a trend inherent in the 
systemic change underway in PETs and as its unavoidable consequence during the 
transition period. Initial conditions, i.e. the economic crisis in the last years of the 
command economy and all the legacies of inefficient and distorted economic structures, 
are often put forward as major causes of recession, once the economy has been opened 
to the wind of market competition (Balcerowicz, 1995). The very fact that 
transformational recession has spread over all PETs backs the argument of a structural 
or 'systemic' recession. Thus, output fall can be explained as a rational process and can 
be seen as desirable and useful insofar as it is supposed to facilitate an efficiency-
improving close-down of enterprises and industries producing a negative value added 
(Hughes & Hare, 1991), which improves economic efficiency. Kornai (1994) contends 
that a hardening budget constraint has compelled the enterprises to adjust their 
production downwards. He further argues that initial reforms of the transition period 
have destroyed former institutions and planned coordination mechanisms without  
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setting up new institutions that fit the market; a sort of vacuum in economic 
coordination results in a recession. Blanchard (1997) explains that disorganisation of 
backward and forward linkages along the chain of planned input supplies has not paved 
the way for new market relationships. In the command economy each enterprise had 
only a few suppliers and customers. A hold-up problem arises from such a situation 
(Blanchard and Kremer 1997) that generates an overall lack of confidence in an 
uncertain or 'no future' economic environment in which no one (after state desertion) 
and nothing can impede the development of opportunistic behaviour. For fear of being 
held up by the downstream customer, each producer of intermediary products will stop 
its production and, by the same token, will break-up the chain of inter-industry 
relationships. Production must fall due to input shortages. 
 Using a computable general equilibrium model Roberts (1997) concludes: there 
is no consensus as to a definite theoretical explanation of output fall, and empirical 
evidence does not help to discriminate decisively among available explanations. This is 
exactly the state of art that overwhelms what we define as a concept specific to the 
transition period. The only cautious and sensible conclusion to date is that many factors 
have combined their economic effects to determine a transformational recession. 
However, in 2001, transformational recession has reached its end in all PETs, the last 
recession year being 1999 in Croatia, Estonia, Lithuania, Moldova, Romania, Serbia-
Montenegro and the Ukraine. In this respect, the typical recession triggered by transition 
is over now. 
A strong decrease in employment has accompanied the early years of transition 
with a time lag compared to the sequence of output fall. The rise of unemployment was 
less than proportional to the latter, meaning a decline in labour productivity. The 
stylised fact to be explained is a sort of inertial behaviour of unemployment rate with 
respect to output fall, laying some grounds for the assumption of a structural or 
transitional component of unemployment, not linked to the output level (Burda, 1994). 
However, a high unemployment rate still prevailed after economic recovery, and large 
differences showed up in unemployment rates among the PETs, both pointing at a 
second stylised fact: unemployment generated by enterprise restructuring has not yet 
been 'mopped up' by new economic activities, namely in the newly developing private 
sector. This empirical phenomenon has been called transitional unemployment by Boeri 
(1994).  
The first analysis basically considers unemployment as a transition between a 
former job (in the state sector) and a new job (in the private sector). In the Aghion-
Blanchard (1994) model, the growth of private employment is an increasing function of 
the unemployment rate. Therefore, the expansion of the private sector 'mops up' job 
losses due to state enterprises restructuring. Aghion and Blanchard demonstrate the 
existence of an optimal unemployment rate (and an optimal speed of transition) that is 
reached when the number of job losses due to restructuring is equal to the number of 
workers hired in the new private sector. However, Blanchard (1997) believes that 
negative initial shocks have led to excessive unemployment rates that slow down 
restructuring and the pace of transition.   
The empirical evidence of an extremely low outflow from unemployment, as 
well as the very long average duration of unemployment in PETs have reduced the 
attractiveness of this model of optimal labour reallocation. This is the starting point of 
an alternative analysis by Boeri (1994), in which transitional unemployment is 
characterised as a 'stagnant pool': once in the pool, the unemployed have a low  
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probability of leaving it. The labour market adjustment is not providing a transition 
from a (former) job to unemployment and then back from unemployment to a new job. 
On the other hand, the unemployment inflow is rather slow reflecting a slower pace of 
restructuring than the one desired by reformers, but unemployment outflow is even 
slower. Such a low turnover in the unemployment stagnant pool is at odds with Aghion-
Blanchard assumptions. Available data shows that employment growth in the private 
sector does not basically rely on hiring unemployed workers on the market. It consists 
instead in direct job transfers from the state sector to the private sector and in hiring 
new entrants in the labour force. The unemployed, being less skilled on average, are not 
(or rarely) re-employed. Boeri (2000) divides workers who have left state enterprises into 
those who have voluntarily left and those who have been fired: the former are more 
numerous than the latter in CEECs. This is another fact that does not agree with the 
assumptions of the Aghion-Blanchard model that ascribes job losses primarily to 
restructuring. So far no PET has been able to get rid of transitional unemployment. In 
the CEECs, the unemployment rate has climbed above the EU average in recent years 
and may increase again as a result of EU accession that threatens the less competitive 
CEEC firms. In Balkan countries, the unemployment rate is still skyrocketing over 20% 
while in the CIS12, in spite of delayed restructuring, it has already reached three-quarters 
of the EU level on average. The end of transitional unemployment cannot be expected 
in the foreseeable future.  
Barterisation is the most paradoxical phenomenon in the process of 
transformation of a command economy into a fully-fledged market economy. A variety 
of non monetary means of settlement have developed in Russia and the CIS: inter-
enterprise credits, payment arrears to suppliers, workers and fiscal authorities (or to 
banks in charge of collecting taxes), and then payment in goods or services (barter stricto 
sensu), debt settlement with money surrogates such as prostoi veksels (promissory notes) 
and peredvodnoi veksels (bills of exchange) issued by enterprises, debt offsets in goods, and 
wage, pension and tax payments in goods. All of them are used in an ad hoc, often illegal, 
sometimes criminal, bilateral trade. Following the current literature, we call 'barter' (lato 
sensu) the whole variety of these non monetary payments which have expanded up to 
70% of GDP in Russia and 80% in Ukraine in 1998. Such a phenomenon is quite 
specific to post-communist transition in the CIS and, to a lesser extent, in CEECs.  
Explanations of barterisation are many-fold, revealing a still unclear and non-
stabilised economic analysis of the phenomenon (Vincentz, 2000). Emerging hypotheses 
are a myriad, so that we cannot screen all of them in depth. Hyperinflation is one of the 
first factors which have been suggested as a cause of demonetisation in PETs. However, 
barter had not reached its peak in the CIS in 1992-1993 when inflation rates were over 
1,000%. They peaked after 1995, when inflation rates were at a two-digit level and 
decreasing (Ledeneva & Seabright, 2000). Moreover, in other regions of the world 
economy, such as Latin America in the seventies, long hyperinflation waves have not 
triggered barterisation to the same extent as in PETs. A second argument links 
barterisation to the credit crunch generated by a too restrictive monetary policy. In tightly 
hardening the liquidity constraint of Russian (CIS) enterprises, credit crunch compelled 
them not to pay and then to resort to money surrogates, and finally to payments in 
goods (Woodruff, 1999). A third approach of barterisation states that it is transition-
specific in countries where enterprise budget constraints have not been hardened enough, or 
not at all (Rostowski 1993). Non payment and barter are the tools through which 
enterprise managers use to carry on with the soft budget constraint that has prevailed in  
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the command economy and delay restructuring (Commander 2000). This argument 
traces back to the hypothesis of managerial entrenchment (below). Survival strategies of 
enterprises and managers (Andreff 1996) are facilitated by maintaining the same supply 
network within which it is easy to substitute barter to monetary transactions. Thus, the 
very existence of non restructured and non profitable firms is, per se, a source of 
barterisation (Poser 1998). The failure of most privatisation programmes to provide 
efficient corporate governance structures helps to maintain quantitative objectives 
instead of promoting profit maximizing within privatised firms.  
The fourth well-known analysis of barterisation may be titled the hypothesis of a 
virtual economy in PETs, in particular in Russia and the CIS. Here barter is a way of hiding 
the ‘true’ (and very low) market value of the output produced in Russia – because a part 
of the economy is simply virtual, and of distorting the real value of profits in order to 
avoid taxation (Gaddy & Ickes, 1998). The virtual economy is based on illusion, and the 
result is that the Russian economy claims to be bigger than it actually is, and it spends 
much more than it can really afford. The very large industrial sector seems to produce 
some value whereas, in fact, it is value-destroying. But this reality is concealed by an 
arbitrary price system, namely barter pricing. The output of the virtual economy is 
measured with overvalued prices; thus, the Russian GDP is artificially inflated and its 
annual growth is statistically exaggerated. Since the price depends on the means of 
payment, enterprises attempt to pay in goods as much as they can, and keep cash for 
transactions that can only be settled in cash. Barter is more significant in enterprises 
whose managers resist restructuring. Those enterprises which shed labour and increase 
labour productivity have a smaller share of barter in their overall sales than those which 
keep over-manning even when output falls (Berglöf & Vaitilingam, 1999). A fifth 
hypothesis has its roots in institutional failures, primarily linked to nascent banking and tax 
systems, as the determinants of barterisation. Barter results from non implementation of 
new accounting rules, and non enforcement of laws regulating debt settlements and 
bankruptcies; it is also due to absent sanctions for non payment. Indebted firms can 
openly reveal a profit without paying any tax or debt. In addition, the Russian (CIS) 
banking system is markedly inefficient, thus costly for clients, and cash payment is 
forbidden for large transactions in order to prevent capital flight (Poser, 1998). Hence, 
barter is safer and cheaper. The weaker the state and institutions, the more widespread is 
barter. Ickes (2000) concludes that non monetary transactions are a sort of institutional 
trap of transition. 
Market imperfection and multiple equilibria are backing a sixth train of thought as 
regards barterisation. In most PETs monopolistic competition prevails, a legacy of the 
command economy. A statistically significant relationship between the degree of market 
power and the share of barter has been found on a wide sample of enterprises in various 
PETs (Carlin et al. 2000). Barter increases enterprise differentiation, thus diminishing 
competition among enterprises. It creates distinct 'islands' of local monopoly power 
(Ledeneva & Seabright, 2000). Inertia in inter-industry and inter-firm relationships is the 
cornerstone of a seventh analysis of barterisation. Barter expands through supplier-
customer relationships and creates a chain of debts (Marin & Schnitzer, 1999). The 
purchaser's lack of liquidity gives him/her an opportunity of hold up if he/she threatens 
not to pay the input supplier, and he/she uses such a threat as a lever to lower prices, 
thus equilibrating the bargaining power between contracting parties. Equilibrium is 
reached when the input supplier accepts a lower price, given that his/her only 
alternatives consist in either insisting to maintain the initial price or involving the violent  
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entrepreneurship (see below) or mafia into the transaction's problem solving. In fact, 
barter introduces a second profitable transaction in the form of a payment in goods, the 
client (purchaser) committing him/herself not to exploit his/her bargaining power and 
accepting to share the profit with the input supplier. Through barter, the two enterprises 
lock each other in the transaction but eventually avoid the hold up problem.  
A last interpretation of barterisation is to view it as the result of a predatory co-
operation  (Poser, 2000) which can be put in a nutshell as follows. Whilst economic 
interdependencies force economic agents to cooperate, non monetary transactions are 
the vehicle for collusion and rent extraction detrimental to third parties. Upstream and 
downstream firms collude for credit from held up banks. Enterprises and banks collude 
to show they are safe and viable in order to extract credit from the central bank. Insiders 
(workers and managers) collude to force the state to bail-out their enterprise. 
Enterprises collude in overvaluing their output in order to extract a tax credit (and thus 
they create a virtual economy). Enterprises, central and local governments mimic the 
behaviour in tune with the IMF conditionality, reduce subsidies and balance their 
budgets in order to extract credit from international organisations.  
Barterisation is probably the best example of a concept (and a reality) specific to 
the transition period. Some sort of barter is durable and widespread, though unevenly, 
in all PETs. Barterisation is one of the most striking surprises or unexpected events in 
the transformation process. We have just seen how numerous are the publications on 
this topic, and our non exhaustive survey has pointed to no less than seven analytical 
explanations of barter in PETs. Barter has not disappeared in any of them, although it 
has significantly declined in CEECs and it has also been on the decline in the CIS12 
since the Russian financial crash in 1998. However, a period of time is still needed for 
barterisation to fade away and for transition to end up after a second stage of ‘de-
barterisation’.  
Another transitional surprise is the growth of the informal economy, previously 
named the underground or shadow economy in the former centrally planned system. 
The content of this sector's activity has changed with transition, but its size has 
increased whereas mainstream economics was assuming that legalised market 
mechanisms would shrink it or even phase it out. Deregulation, the withering away of 
the State, and the dismantling of the State sector through privatisation were assumed to 
eliminate the informal economy and to help transform it into a private market economy, 
once the latter is no longer forbidden. The opposite has happened: the early years of 
transition exhibit an increasing share of the unofficial economy in GDP (Table 5), 
alongside progress in privatisation. Only Estonia, Poland, Slovakia and Uzbekistan had a 
smaller informal economy in 1995 than in 1990. What went wrong is basically due to 
missing or unenforced institutions. 
A full theory of the new informal economy in PETs has not yet been 
formulated. We can only focus on some specifics of the transition period that relate to 
the weakness of the institutional framework. In most PETs, laws are so lax that 
management is readily susceptible to negligence or to conducting corporate affairs for 
personal profit. There are very few barriers to self-dealing behaviour of managers and 
sanctions against it are limited to lawsuits by shareholders. However, the latter cannot 
sue if they lack complete information (which is the usual case with managerial 
entrenchment, see below) about the financial affairs of the corporation, and even if they 
can sue, their suit is hindered by the weakness of the judicial system. A clear definition 
of theft has practically disappeared in PETs while theft is usually the fastest way of  
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transferring property rights (Mlcoch, 1998). How can one sue thieves in a court under 
such circumstances?  
 
Table 5: Share of the unofficial economy in transition countries (% of GDP) 
Country  1990 1992 1995 
Azerbaijan  21.9 39.2 60.6 
Belarus  15.4 13.2 19.3 
Bulgaria  25.1 25.0 36.2 
Czech Republic  6.7  16.9  11.3 
Estonia  19.9 25.4 11.8 
Georgia  24.9 52.3 62.6 
Hungary 28.0 30.6 29.0 
Kazakhstan  17.0 24.9 34.3 
Latvia  12.8 34.3 35.3 
Lithuania 11.3 39.2 21.6 
Moldova 18.1 37.3 35.7 
Poland  19.6 19.7 15.2 
Romania 13.7 18.0 19.1 
Russia  14.7 32.8 41.6 
Slovakia 7.7  17.6  5.8 
Ukraine  16.3 33.6 48.9 
Uzbekistan  11.4 11.7 6.5 
Mean  16.7 27.7 29.0 
Source : EBRD (1997). 
As communism was collapsing, existing criminal organisations, dishonest 
bureaucrats and managers had incentives to pursue profitable schemes, legal, illegal or 
borderline. For instance, managerial wealth is all too often built up not by efficient 
company performance or restructuring, but by deliberate and semi-legal capital 
extraction. Looting privatised enterprises has become one of the preferred managerial 
exercises, e.g., by asset stripping or tunnelling. Common ways of unofficial asset 
transfers have been: favourable conditions of sale (lower price, longer payment 
deadlines) offered to politically suitable buyers for buying-out state-owned enterprises’ 
assets; loans allocated to managers by state-owned banks without any mortgage or 
guarantees; repayment of shares or loans from the assets of the privatised company; 
fictitious recapitalisation; concealed appropriation of the company's profit by majority 
shareholders and/or managers; criminal acts such as deliberate and fraudulent 
bankruptcy prior to privatisation, embezzlements, bribery, fraud, corruption; and finally 
operating on informal stock markets. The above list is by no way exhaustive.  
Once the institutions of the former regime have been weeded out and the state 
apparatus has been disorganised, first the government consists of a large number of 
substantially independent bureaucrats pursuing their own agenda, including bribe taking; 
second, the government is ineffective in providing basic services (including protection, 
security, police), courts are ineffective in resolving disputes (transaction costs skyrocket) 
and agreements are enforced privately (Frye & Shleifer, 1997). Shop-owners and 
property owners often pay private security agencies to protect them from crime and 
help them resolve contractual disputes. This informal institution is known as a ‘roof’ 
(krycha) in Russia, and an ‘umbrella’ in Poland. Private enforcement of law and order  
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plays a greater role in Russia than in Poland, since economic crime is more widespread 
in the former. 
 
 
Table 6: Average bribery payments as share of gross firm revenues 
Country  % of revenues Country  % of revenues 
Albania 4.0  Kyrgyzstan  5.3 
Armenia 4.6  Latvia  1.4 
Azerbaijan 5.7  Lithuania  2.8 
Belarus 1.3  Moldova 4.0 
Bulgaria 2.1  Poland    1.6 
Croatia 1.1  Romania  3.2 
Czech Republic  2.5  Russia  2.8 
Estonia 1.6  Slovakia  2.5 
Georgia 4.3  Slovenia  1.4 
Hungary 1.7  Ukraine  4.4 
Kazakhstan 3.1  Uzbekistan  4.4 
Source: Hellman et al. (2000). 
A specific industry or business – known as ‘violent entrepreneurship’ (Volkov, 
1999) according to a classical analysis – has developed to cope with extremely high 
transaction costs. It is an informal ‘transaction costs saving industry’ since it takes over 
the task of private enforcement of contractual rights. This business is partly criminal, 
partly legal. Its main function is an ‘enforcement partnership’ (silovoe partnerstvo), meaning 
that an organised group or enterprise, deriving from the skilful use of actual or potential 
force on a commercial basis, is employed to maintain certain (informal) institutional 
conditions of business activity, such as security, contract enforcement, dispute 
settlement and transaction insurance (in the absence of the enforcement of formal 
market institutions by state authorities). This business grew out of the regularised 
protection racket (krycha) of the late 1980s and early 1990s and enrolled, in CIS 
countries, former sportsmen, Afghanistan warriors, etc. In the face of frequent non 
repayment of debts, failure to observe contracts, the spread of swindling and theft, on 
the one hand, and the shortage of legal protection and justice, on the other hand, 
businessmen and firms were compelled to pay such mediators ‘for solving questions’ 
(reshat’ voprosy). The questions to be solved were: physical protection, debt recovery, 
dispute settlement, mediation between private business and state bureaucracy, obtaining 
permissions and licences, registration, tax exemptions, the use of state organs – fire 
inspection, sanitary control services, etc. – also to impose damage on competing 
companies. Afterwards, these groups of violent entrepreneurs have invested their 
money in firms whose problems they have solved, and sometimes even introduced their 
representative to the board of directors. For sure, they are outsiders in the ownership 
structure, probably the least desirable ones. Obviously, the price paid for ‘question 
solving’ (about 20-30% of the profit of the client enterprise) reflects high transaction 
costs in an institutionally unstable economic environment. In addition, all PETs have 
been affected, by having to bribe government officials (Table 6).  
A more critical analysis of the extralegal and criminal economy (Oleinik, 2001) 
starts from the hypothesis of the predominant importance of rent and profit seeking in 
the behaviour of those involved in criminal markets, in a context where weak or absent  
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institutions relax all the ethical bounds to economic activity. The ensuing break up of 
norms and values, freeing human behaviour from any moral attitude, is a basic incentive 
to outlaw rent and profit seeking without any restraint. Such a situation favours the 
unilateral self-enforcement of explicit or implicit contracts by resorting to violent 
entrepreneurship. This is facilitated by the economic environment of network capitalism 
that promotes a contracting process outside the emerging legal framework. In PETs, the 
high rate of criminality spreads from absent alternatives to such a behaviour which 
eventually casts doubts on the validity of both old vanishing norms and values and 
newly emerging ones. Since we do not believe that crony network capitalism is the final 
aim of transition, the latter will not be over as long as PETs remain plagued by a 
sprawling informal sector with a hyper-active criminal sub-sector. A possibly long and 
painful second stage of transition has to call a halt to this most hideous face of the 
transition process. 
Among the concepts emerging from the analysis of transition, managerial 
entrenchment is the one which has been less focused on in the literature. Managerial 
entrenchment is a consequence of non standard methods of privatisation (Bornstein, 
1997) and of the weak corporate governance structures they have generated. The focus 
has been put on the link between privatisation, corporate governance and enterprise 
restructuring (Andreff, 1999b). What does managerial entrenchment exactly consist of? 
It refers to the empirical evidence of incumbent managers who continue to manage 
privatised (and of course public) corporations. We can find such a situation in Western 
capitalist joint stock companies. What is new with PETs is not only the magnitude of 
the phenomenon, but the means utilised by incumbent managers to keep their power 
over corporate and privatised former state-owned enterprises. First, mass privatisation 
and MEBOs have eventually transferred controlling blocks of shares to incumbent 
managers. In the whole sample of PETs, two-thirds of all the privatised firms have had 
their shares transferred to private owners through mass privatisation or MEBOs 
(Andreff, 1999b). Managers are even more strongly entrenched in still state-owned 
enterprises and in privatised enterprises with a share of residual state property.  
In privatised enterprises in PETs, incumbent managers also unscrupulously 
utilised all legal and illegal means for guaranteeing the firm's survival and their own 
entrenchment in management positions (Labaronne, 1998). Managers have retained or 
hidden relevant information, or introduced bias into it, in order to increase the 
opportunity cost of monitoring by shareholders. They have not been disciplined by the 
threat of bankruptcy insofar as bankruptcy laws are scarcely enforced in PETs. They 
have not been disciplined either by the threat of takeover, merger or acquisition since 
stock exchanges in PETs are tiny, non transparent and inefficient, reflecting an 
extremely imperfect competition on capital markets. Moreover, incumbent managers are 
involved in networks linking managers, bureaucrats, politicians, former nomenklatura and 
former komsomol members that make their governance position impregnable. Last but 
not least, incumbent managers have circumvented the law: one can list more than 
twenty sorts of violations of the corporate law in Russian privatised enterprises, 
extending from not convening the shareholder assembly to votes by a show of hands. 
Managerial entrenchment strategies have been successful: managers remain in power at 
the head of numerous firms in the CIS, even though the same evidence is less common 
in CEECs. The swifter the privatisation drive, the more unchanged is managerial 
governance that accompanied the change of property rights (Brada, 1996). Even if the 
specificity of managerial entrenchment in privatised enterprises in PETs has been  
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correctly grasped in the most recent literature, a deeper economic analysis of this 
concept remains to be elaborated. Managerial entrenchment might well be the most 
long-lasting specific feature delaying the end of the transition period. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
Our conclusion is that EU enlargement is not a sufficient yardstick by which the 
end of transition can be fixed, not even in the CEECs. Convergence criteria are of 
interest. However, filling the average GDP per capita gap between PETs and the EU 
will take from fifteen years to at least one century depending on the PET one is looking 
at. Institution building varies significantly among the PETS in favour of CEECs, but the 
non accession countries are trapped for a long time in a no man’s land between the 
former system and a  market economy with its necessary institutions. With our 
privileged analysis, transition ends when transformational recession, transitional 
unemployment, barterisation, the typical informal sector and managerial entrenchment 
will all have vanished. Transformational recession may be over, but the four other 
characteristics of transition are not going to fade away without a second stage of 
transition.  
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